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In the SupreiDe Court
of the State of Utah
HOTEL UTAH COiliPANY, a corporation,
Petiti.oner,
vs.
R. H. DALR.YMPLE, OTTO WEISLEY and H. FRED EGAN constituting the Utah Labor Relations Board,
and LAUNDRY WORKERS LOCAL
UNION NO. 316,
Defendants.

Case No.
7290

BRIEF IN BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT
The Utah Labor Relations Board certified the
Laundry Workers Local Union No. 316 the collective
bargaining agent for all of petitioner's employees in its
laundry unit. Thereafter the petitioner ignored such
certification, and refused to bargain; whereupon unfair
labor practices were charged against petitioner. The
Board, after hearing such charges, thereupon formally
ordered petitioner to bargain; petitioner again ignored
the Board and sued for a writ of review in this Court.
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At the outset we desire to expressly invite the
Court's attention to an odd situation in a labor controversy. There were at least thirty-five laundry employees
of Petitioner involved in this matter, in addition to its
executive and supervisory personnel. The case was prolonged over quite a period of time, and divided into three
separate hearings, viz., June 24, 1948, July 12, 1948, and
December 6th, 1948. Yet not a single witness was called
to the witness stand by Petitioner, except Louis H. Callister (attorney for Petitioner), and he quite naturally
and obviously put into the record the precipate of Petitioner's bitter opposition to the Board's decision in this
matter. Mr. Callister testified (Tr. 16, Dec. 6 hearing
1948), as follows:
MR. CALLISTER: No, we weren't crossed up
at all. As I told you heretofore, there were two
reasons why we would not bargain. The first
is that the unit was not the appropriate unit for
the purpose of collective bargaining because it
was contrary to the laws and practices of the
industry particularly of the lloltd Utah Company; and second, that the employees were deprived of their right to indicate their desire by
secret ballot." (Emphasis ours.)
Thus it appears that the Petitioner is intent on
pre-empting the Board in a determination of which employees shall constitute a collective bargaining unit, thus
ignoring the welfare of its employes and in violation of
the statute, which says the Board shall decide in eacl1
case in order to insure the employees full benefits of
self organization, etc. (Sub-section (b) of Section 49-1-17
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of the .\rt.) Thus they upset craft unionism; furthermore,
Petitioner ~ti·ive~ to substitute its judgn1ent in place of
the Board's judgment in selecting the appropriate manner of ascertaining what rollective bargaining agent, if
any, Petitioner's laundry employees have chosen.
It would seem perfectly obvious that, if there was
even a little doubt respecting whom Petitioner's laundry
employees desired to represent them, or the manner in
which such employees desired to make their wishes
known, the Petitioner would have had at least some of
its en1ployees testify at the hearing. And on the other
hand, even if there was a little doubt that the usual
craft unit ''Tas inappropriate to the operations of Petitioner's hotel, then certainly, in that event, Petitioner
would have called one of its executives to the witness
stand and placed at least some evidence in the record
touching the merits of a contention it so long and vigorous!~' proclaims.
We shall treat Petitioner's assignments of error in
the order in which they appear in its brief.
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO.1
"The order of the Utah Labor Relations
Board, dated the 27th day of January, 1949, is
void in that it is not supported by any Findings
of Fact, as provided for in Title 49-1-18, Subsection C, Utah Code Annotated 1943."
In the unfair labor practices procedure in this matter the union filed charges before the Board alleging 1,
that the Utah Hotel Company is engaged in the general
hotel business in Salt Lake City, and has engaged in and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is engaging in unfair labor practices. 2, that the union
is now and ever since August 5, 1948 has been and is
-the duly authorized collective bargaining representative
of respondents employees in a collective bargaining unit
appropriate for the purposes of bargaining with employer respecting hours, wages and conditions of employment. 3, that the Utah Hotel Company has deliberately
and wilfully refused to bargain with the union and that
on several occasions the union has endeavored to bargain
with the Utah Hotel Company in such behalf, but that
the company continued to refuse or recognize the union
as the bargaining agent of its laundry employees. 4, that
the company has interfered and restrained its employees
in their rights guaranteed in Section 49-1-15 of Utah
Labor Relations Act. 5, that the Company has dominated
and interfered with the affairs of the union. 6, that
the Company has discriminated against certain of its
laundry employees. 7, that su-ch unfa.ir labor practices
on the pa.rt of the Company ~are wnfai.r labor practices
affectin.g int11astate commerce and the orderly operation of bus-iness within the mea;ning of the Utah Labor
Relations Act.
The union therefor prayed the board to issue its
complaint in the premises. On the 16th day of N ovember, 1948, the board issued its complaint stating: 1. That
the Company is a corporation of the State of Utah and
does business in Salt Lake City. 2. That the Company
is an employer within the meaning of the Utah Labor
Relations Act. 3. That the union is a labor organization
within the meaning of said Act. 4. That respondent has reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fused to bargain collertiYely with the union in violation
of the Board's certification of August 5, 1948, and in
violation of the Art.
The answer of the Company admits paragraphs 1
and 2 of the complaint and admits that it has refused
to bargain with the union, and as an affirmative defense, sets out in its answer that the union is not the
authorized bargaining representative of the Company's
employees in the laundry unit, and that the unit found
by the Board is not an appropriate unit, and that the
method of selecting the bargaining unit on behalf of
the Company's laundry employees as found by the Board
was wrong.
The hearing to determine the issues respecting the
unfair labor charges was held pursuant to notice of
the Board on the 6th day of December, 1948, such hearing was conducted by the Honorable Daniel Edwards,
a Commissioner of the Utah Labor Relations Board,
who presided at the hearing. Commissioner Edwards,
who conducted the hearing, made and entered the following findings of faet:
1. That Hotel Utah Company, hereinafter
referred to as Respondent, is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Utah and
as such is doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
2. That Respondent is an employer within
the meaning of Title 49-1-10, Sub-section (2),
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended.
3. That Laundry Workers Local Union No.
316, hereinafter referred to as Complainant, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Title
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
49-1-10, sub-section (5), as amended.
4. That a· hearing was held before the Honorable Daniel Edwards on June 24, 1948, on a
Petition for Investigation and Certification of
Representatives in the matter of case No. 615.
5. That the Utah Labor Relations Board
found that an appropriate collective bargaining
unit consisted as follows:
All laundry production workers and exclude clerical workers and supervisors
with power to hire and fire.
6. That the Utah Labor Relations Board
certified the Petitioner as the lega:lly selected and
designated agent of the employees of Respondent
in the above described unit for the purpose of
eollctive bargaining on August 5, 1948.
7. That Complainant and Rspondent did
meet on several occasions but did not enter into
collective bargaining.
8. That Respondent did refuse to bargain
with Complainant on the grounds: (a) That the
unit found by the Board was not an appropriate
unit. (b) That the Board's method of determining the collective bargaining representative, if
any, was not in conformity with the Utah Labor
Relations Act.
9.

That Respondent did refuse to bargain.

Thereafter, on the 27th day of J amiary 1949, the
Utah Labor Relations Board acting through Commissioners Daniel Edwards, H. Fred Egan, and R. H. Dalrymple
concurred in Commissioner Edwards findings of fact and
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conclusions, that is to say, agreed to and adopted such
findings of fact and conclusions and issued its order requiring the Company ( 1) to cease and desist from any
further Unfair Labor Practices, (2) to enter into collective bargaining with the union, ( 3) and notify the
Board of compliance on the part of the Company, with
the Board's order.
Petitioner protests that there are no legal findings
of fact in this case. Let us examine this issue; Subsection (c) of Section -1:9-1-18 of the Utah Labor Relations Act, reads as follows:
. . . ''Thereafter in its discretion, the board,
upon notice, may take further testimony or hear
argument. If upon all the testimony taken the
board shall he of the opinion that any person
named in the complaint has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then
the hoard shall state its findings of fact and shall
issue and cause to he served on such person an
order to cease and desist from such unfair labor
practice, and to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay as will ffectuate the policies of this
act. Such order may further require such person
to make reports from time to time showing the
extent to which it has complied with the order.
If upon all the testimony taken the board shall
be of the opinion that no person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any
such unfair labor practice, then the board shall
state its findings of fact and shall issue an order
dismissing the said complaint.''
There can be no doubt that full, separately stated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and comprehensive findings of fact were made by Commissioner Edwards. Nor can there be any doubt that
such findings of fact are agreed to and concurrd in by
the other two commissioners. (See order of the Board
January 27, 1949.)
It is far fetched and remote for petitioner to
contend that the Board should adopt any particular
method of stating the findings of fact with any sort of
meticulous exactitude, for the reason that, all that is
contemplated by the section of the statute above referred
to, is that the Board state its findings of fact, issue its
order to cease and desist, and t1ake affirmat,ive act~on.
The manner, method, form, and fashion in which, or
time when the Board shall state its findings of fact is
not mentioned by the statute. Indeed the board in this
respect has a very wide latitude and discretion under
the statute. See Teamsters Local Union No. 22·2 and
the Industrial Commission vs. Strevell Patterson Hardware Co., 174 P2d 164, in which case the court says:
"Section 49-1-18 U.C.A. 1943 required the
Board to make findings of fact after testimony
taken on complaint that any person has engaged
in unfair 'labor practices. It does not provide for
any particular type of findings of fact, and it is
our opinion that in the absence of such instruction from the legislature, findings of fact which
would be sufficient to sustain a judgment or order
of a court will be sufficient to sustain an order
of the Board.''
If findings of fact are stated, the above section of
the Act is complied with. The Act doesn't even require
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Board to state its findings of fact in writing. The
testimony in the case 1nust be reduced to writing, but
there is no such provision of the section prescribing
such reduction respecting the Boards findings of fact,
hence if the board decides that it wants to adopt the
findings of fact of its own member, made pursuant to its
own hearing, that is certainly within the discretion of
the board. If a board member has made, in the case,
full and con1plete itemized findings of fact, which meets
the approval of and are concurred and adopted by the
whole Board, why should the Board be put to the extra
burden of making findings of fact all over again-that
would seem to be nonsen~e.
The board, under this section of the statute, had
the obvious right to adopt and concur in the findings
of fact of its own member. Indeed all that can be
said respecting any insufficiency of findings of fact, is
that the findings as originally found were found by a
minority and adopted by a majority of the Board; certainly when the findings of fact were ultimately concurred in by all of the board members, then such findings of fact become the legal, binding, unanimous findings
of fact by the Board.

PETITIONER'S

ASSIGN~fENT

OF ERROR NO. 2

The Board erred in directing a cross-check of the
Company's payroll as the suitable method to ascertain
the representative of a majority of the employees.
Sub-section (c) of Section 49-1-17 reads as follows:
"Whenever a question affecting intrastate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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commerce or the orderly operation of industry
arises concerning the representation of employees, the board may investigate such controversy
and certify to the parties, in writing, the name
or names of the representatives that have been
designated or selected. In any such investigation,
the hoard shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a
proceeding under Section 11 ( 18) or otherwise,
and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertailn such
y,epresent~atives. (Emphasis ours.)
It readily appears from the language employed in
the above section; that if the Board decides to make an
investigation in a representation case, then and in that
event, the Board must provide for a hearing and that
is the only must; the hearing shall, of course, be upon
due notice and appropriate. Now the hearing can be
in conjunction with an unfair labor practice charge or
it can be otherwise. No provision is contained in the
section providing for an election. Indeed the legislature
has given wide discretion to the Board to determine how
and by what method a collective bargaining agent shall
be designated. Indeed the Board can use any method
suitable to ascertain such designation. It may take a
secret ballot, but this is only a suggestion on the part
of the legislature. The emphasis is on the discretion of
the Board to use any suitable method. Assume that the
Board would decide, that here the suitable method to
designate the representative among the employees, would
be by a ballot, there is absolutely nothing in the section that
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even squints at when the ballot shall be cast. For all
that appears, the ballot can be held before the investigation. or after the inYestigation, or during the investigation, or before, after or during the hearing. Indeed the
discretion of the Board pursuant to this section seems
to be Yery wide and general. The Board is not required
to investigate. The only thing it must ·ao, if it decides to investigate, is hold a hearing and when the
hearing is to be held is not mentioned. We therefore submit, in this case the Board did investigate, the Board did
hold a hearing, and the Board did certify in writing the
collective bargaining agent, which was the union, that
had been designated.
Now if the Board knew, as it surely did, that a
collectiYe bargaining representative had already been
designated by the laundry employees, and in writing,
over the solemn signatures of the respective employees,
composing the unit, then why resort to the extra time,
ceremony and procedure of affixing a cross to still
another designation exhibit. And it is important, if the
Court please, to keep in mind in this behalf, that there
was not here presented an intramural scrap between
two or more labor unions, contending for a bargaining
representative. There was only one single labor union
involved; so it was merely a question of no union or the
Laundry Workers Union. This situation made it relatively easy for the Board to determine whether or not
the laundry employees wanted to be unionized; and furthermore, the testimony shows approximately 35 employees comprised the laundry unit (Tr. 6, June 24th
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hearing) of the Hotel Utah; that 70% of the employees
composing the laundry unit were represented by the
union (Tr. 30, June 24th hearing). Mr. Harter, the International Representative, testified when questioned by
Mr. Callister: (Tr. 30, June 24th hearing)
BY MR. CALLISTER:
Q.

Now Mr. Harter, it was at this meeting last
night when individuals were present whose
names appear on Petitioner's Proposed Exhibit 1, at that time did you tell them that
by signing that authorization that they would
strengthen the case so there would be no
election~

A.

No, I didn't think we would have to have an
election anyway, with 100%.

Now what persuaded the Board to order a crosscheck, which is the common method in this t~pe of case,
where all the union testimony and exhibits are thrown
open to invite examination and cross-examination by the
adversary, of course we do not know. The history of
collective bargaining negotiations, for one thing, on the
part of an employer is very important. References were
made on page 14 of the June 24th transcript to another
Hotel Utah Company case, which was heard before the
Utah Labor Relations Board, and apparently it was a
long and notorious proceeding (Tr. 15, June 24th hearing). Apparently the union in that case had a big majority of the employees of the Hotel Utah, and then the
Hotel Utah clamored for an election, precisely as they
are doing here, in the same words and by the same reaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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soning, and an election was ordered and the union lost
that election by one vote (Tr. 18, July 12th hearing).
On the other hand, there was apparently an election
lately held in another case between Hotel Utah and another union, and the employees voted in favor of the
union 39 to 1 ( Tr. 18, July 12th hearing), so the election
issue on the part of the company can't be very sincere.
That the Board does a good conscientious, honest
and impartial job of administrating the Act and its duties
and obligations, there would seem to be no doubt. (Tr.
16, July 12th hearing.)
"~IR.

CALLISTER: I am sure if that had been
the case, his report would indicate that. This
Board has the machinery to see to it that it is
done without any interference. Now this Board,
Mr. Beck, as you know, conducts an election as
unbiased and expeditious as I have ever seen.
As a matter of fact, it does a better job, in my
opinion, than the National Labor Relations Board,
and I have seen them both in operation, and I
have never had a complaint on this Board conducting an election. They have been cooperating
with the employer as well as the Union-! couldn't criticize them at all. I feel that accusation
is offensive and improper. When this Board conducts an election, it does it right, or it doesn't
conduct it. I have seen that, and you rnay rest
assured if this Board orders an election, it will be
conducted right because Mr. Gehring and Mr.
Cockayne, or whoever conducts the elections are
above reproach, and they would never tolerate
interference by Management or the Union at all."
Thus, when management discharges an obligation,
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the report is generally loud in all directions-however,
if our adversary is so thoroughly sold on the honesty,
integrity and good faith of the Board, why does it so
bitterly oppose the Board in the exercise of the discretion the statute so plainly and palpably delegates to the
Board-unless the Company desires to gain a selfish
unilateral advantage it is not entitled to.
Why should the Board be put to the extra expense,
time and trouble of requiring the company's laundry
employees for a third successive time to express their
preference for a bargaining representative. First, a
very wide majority, in writing over the solemn signatures of the respective laundry employees, designated
the union as their bargaining representative, see Exhibit
A, and again, later, for the second time, these same
employees reiterated their preference, and in writing
too, over their respective signatures, in authorizing, constituting and appointing the union their bargaining
representatve, see Exhibit 1.
That the Board investigated the matter there is no
doubt, hence presumptively, the Board knew and knows
the facts, from direct contact and direct examination
of the laundry employees. Why does the Company challenge the Board, in the presence of the statute that so
expressly provides for this identical procedure. The
statute suggests the Board may hold an election, but the
statute goes further and emphasises the fact that the
Board may exercise other procedure to effectuate the
policy of the Act. The Board knows the history of collective bargaining on the part of the Company, from its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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own files. and knows the history of this case. This history, if the court please, is of paramount, substantial and
great relative hnportance in a labor controversy. The
record discloses that the Company quite deliberately and
most C-onspicuously neither produced nor attempted to
introduce any testimony or any exhibits from its files
or otherwi~e, with the excepting of, Mr. Callister.
~ otwithstanding, the Company had abundant access,
contact. and dominion over its own employees, its own
executive officers, and its own records and files. When
such testimony and such evidence is so easily and readily
available to the Company and under its control and dominion as it is here, the presumption, certainly is-that if
the Company had produced one single employee or one
executive or any of its files, those employees, those executives, and those files would have been detrimental to the
Company and in favor of the Union. Why was the Company so silent, and so inactive in the production of evidence to assist the Board in a determination of the issue,
and why does it protest with such abundant vigor the
Board's decision. There must be a very good reason in
its general strategy-there usually is-the answer might
be procrastination. When everything else fails, procrastination will beat the unions down and break their backs,
because of the turnover in payroll, the waiting out, the disappointments, anxiety, instability and the daily uncertainty of the employment status and the final result. All of
these element~ work to the huge advantage of the employer
and express themselves in the maxim-'' justice delayed is
justice defeated.'' So procrastination Inay be the reason
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for the extra hearing and continuance in this case. The
Company deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the Board's
orders, and incidently it thus gained another delay with
an appeal to this Court.
Petitioner seems to emphasize and rely on the N ational Labor Relations Board holding in the Cudahy
case. The facts in the Cudahy case were entirely different than in the case at bar. In the Cudahy case, two
contending separate unions were campaigning for the
same collective bargaining certificate, so for a most excellent reason the Board decided, to ·effectuate the
policies of the Act, the best way to quiet the strife
existing between the two contending unions was to call
all of the employees into an election and have them
mark a ballot deciding which contending union, they
wanted to serve them as a collective bargaining agent.
In the case at bar, there was only one union involved,
and practically all of the company's employees, had at
two different occasions, expressed their preference in
writing for the Laundry Workers Union. Indeed, no
other union appeared that could assume such jurisdiction. In the matter of A. Sartorius and Co., Inc., and
United Mines Workers of America Dfs-trict No. 50, Local
No. 12090, 40 N.L.R.B. 107, decided April 3, 1942, the
National Labor Relations Board cites the Cudahy case
and then holds :
"The respondent's contention, that it should
not be required to bargain with the Union in the
absence of an election by secret ballot in view
of the alleged doubts concerning the Union's
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majority i:::; silnilarly without merit.
'• "\V e find that on and at all times after June
2-!, 1938, the lTnion was the duly designated representative of the Inajority of the e1nployees in the
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining, and, pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the
_._-\._ct, was the exclusive representative of all the
employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining.'·
Respecting the proposition generally and the disposition of the National Labor Relations Board particularly we cite the following cases:
Consolidated .Jfachine Tool Corporation and
Pattern :Makers League of North America, 67
N.L.R.B. 7-!7 April 25, 1946, in which the board
said:
"We concur in the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the League was on January 16, 1945,
and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees within the appropriate unit. In excepting to this
conclusion, the respondent does not challenge the
Trial Examiner's findings that a majority of the
employees within the appropriate unit had signed
the League's membership application cards by
January 16, 1945, and the 'Candidate's Applications' on March 27, 1945. The respondent contends, however, that the signing of such cards
did not constitute designation of the League as
bargaining representatives on the grounds, in
substance, that the cards contained no express
designation of the League as bargaining agent;
that the pattern makers never became members
of the League, nor did they pay their entire initiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ation fee to the League; that certain of the pattern makers testified at the hearing that they
signed the cards for the purpose of being excluded
from the bargaining unit which the machinists
sought to represent and did not desire representation by the League ; and that the signing and
delivery of the cards by the employees was conditional.
''Like the Trial Examiner, we find no merit
in the respondent's contention. As the Trial Examiner states, an application for membership
implies authority to bargain; neither membership
in, nor payment of dues to a union is determinative of statutory authorization. And we agree
with the Trial Examiner that the testimony of a
signor as to his subjective state of mind at the
time of signing cannot operate to overcome the
effect of his overt action in having signed the
application card. ''
National Labor Relations Board vs. Chicago
Apparatus Company, CCA 7, 116 Fed. 2d 753,
December 12, 1940:
"Application for membership may be counted
in determining whether the union has a majority.
National Labor Relations Board vs. Somerset
Shoe Co., 111 Fed 2d 681; National Labor Relations Board vs. Bradford Dyeing Association,
310 U. S. 318. This is true even though no dues
have been paid."
In th case of Lebanon Steel Foundry vs. N.L.
R.B., 130 Fed. 2d 404, the court held that, the
Wagner Act requires no specific form of authority
to bargain collectively; that authority may be
given by action as well as in words; an application
for union membership implies authority to barSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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gain: not forn1 but intent, i:::; the essential thing;
the intent is n1erelY that the union act as the
employee's represe~tative in collective bargaining; it is only ncessary that it be manifest in
some manner capable of proof, whether by behavior or language: and oral authority is not
invalid, but is merely more difficult to prove.
Petitioners assignment of error No. 2 has no merit.
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
''The Board erred in determining that the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining was 'all laundry production workers'."
Sub-section (c) of Section 49-1-17 reads as follows:
"Whenever a question affecting intrastate
commerce or the orderly operation of industry
arises concerning the representation of employees, the board may investigate such controversy
and certify to the parties, in writing, the name
or names or the representatives that have been
designated or selected . . . ''
Sub-section (b) of

~section

49-1-17 reads as follows:

''The board shall decide in each case whether,
in order to insure to employees the full benefit
of their right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this act, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.'' Emphasis added.)
Sub-section (a) of Section 49-1-17 reads as follows:
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''Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining~' . . .
We quote from page 19 and 20 of Petitioner's brief,
to-wit:
''In making this determination within this
general rule, the Utah Labor Relations Board
. should consider a number of factors, the most
important of which are: The history of collective
bargaining and the history, extent and type of
organization among the employees at the plant
involved and at other plants of the same employer, or at •pJants of other employers in the
same or related industries ; the skill, wages, and
working conditions of the en1ployees; the desires
of the employees; the eligibility of employees for
membership in the union or unions involved; and
the relationship between the unit or units proposed and the operation, organization, and management of the employer's business.
''It is the position of this respondent (?)
that the Utah Labor Relations Board must, in
determining the unit appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining consider all of the factors
hereinabove enumerated.''
That would seem to us to be absolutely good law,
and we whole heartedly concur, agree and adopt it. It
appears that the Board very clearly followed this concept. The history of the Hotel Utah Company's collective
bargaining over a period of 10 years was gone into-the
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extent and type of organization among the employees was
weighed-the eligibility of the employees for membership
in the Latmdry 'y orkers Union, the union involved, the
working conditions, the craft set-up was all considered by
the Board-and so following this concept, of course the
Board did the only proper and fitting thing to do, it set up a
craft unit. All laundry employees were on the same payroll
and heretofore always treated as a craft unit by the Company; no other en1ployees wre on the payroll except
laundry employees-so why mix up the garage mechanics
and the cashiers with the laundry unit-or the bell ~oys
and engineers with the laundry unit-perhaps the Company ·might think this a good idea in an election, because
maybe the garage mechanics, cashiers, bell boys and
engineers are not organized and would vote no union in
an election. But the Board disagreed with the Company.
The Board was thinking about the welfare of the employees in the laundry unit, who had petitioned the
Board for a good and lawful reason. The Company was
thinking about the welfare of the company, and that
thinking was no union, which could be wrong even for
the Hotel Utah Company.
Perhaps we are too naive to recognize and assess,
the true proportion and merit of this assignn1ent. Nowhere does there appear to be. one error by the Board
with respect to this particular assignment. At the beginning of the hearing on June 24th, 1948, . Commissioner Daniel Edwards, stated, at page 2 of the Transcript:
COM. EDWARDS: The hearing will be in sesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sion. Laundry Workers Local No. 316, Petitioner, filed a Petition for Investigation and
Certification of representatives on June 15th,
in which it claims bargaining right for thirtyfive production workers engaged in laundry
work. The number and classification of employment in said unit which the Petitioner
claims to represent consists of thirty inside
laundry workers.
They further request that the unit. shall include all production workers and exclude clerical workers and supervisors with power to
hire and fire.
The Board conducted its usual investigation and served notice of hearing as of the 17th
of June. Said notice was received by Respondent and Petitioner on June 18, 1948.
Hence it appears that the investigation of the claims
of the union as presented in the Petition by the union
were fully investigated by the Board, pursuant to subsection (c) of section 49-1-17 above mentioned, and that
a question affecting intrastate commerce was involved,
and that the facts set out by the union warranted a
hearing pursuant to this particular section. There is
only one thing the Board must do, if it investigates, the
Boa rd must provide for a hearing and it must be appropriate, and upon due notice. These three elements
seem to he mandatory. An election is not mandatory at
all, it is merely discretionary. If the Board decides that
an investigation shall be made, the Board may decide
to hold a secret election. But a secret ballot is not
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required. The Board derides when an election is to be
held, if any, and to illustrate the discretion of the Board,
an election could be held before, during or after an
investigation: an election could be held before the hearing, after the hearing, or during the hearing-the discretion of the Board is that broad. In any event, subsection (h) of the statute was full~· complied with. The
Board had a perfect right to decide that a craft unit
wa~ the n1ost appropriate unit for collective bargaining
commensurate with the welfare of the employees. The
Company contends that they are inconvenienced by such
a unit, but it shows no evidence to that effect because
it can't, and this section of the Statute doesn't say anything about the convenience of the employer, but it does
say that in earh case the Board shall decide what insures
to the employees the full benefits of their rights of self
organization and collective bargaining. The Board complied with the very letter and spirit of this section.
The Supreme Court of the United States in N ationa! Labor Relations Board vs. Hearst Publications,
322 U. S. 111, says on page 134:
''Wide variation in the forms of en1ployee
self-organizations and the complexities of modern
industrial organization make difficult the use of
inflexible rules as the test of an appropriate unit.
Congress was informed of the need for flexibility
in shaping the unit to the particular case and
accordingly gave the Board wide discretion in
the matter. Its choice of a unit is limited specifically only by the requirement that it be an
'employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, subdivision
thereof' and that the selection be made so a~ 'to
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insure to employees the full benefit of their right
to self-organization and to collective bargaining
and otherwise to effectuate the policies of the
Act'. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 146, 85 L. ed
1251, 61 S. Ct. 908. ''
We cite the following case to the proposition; Packard Motor Car Co. vs. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485, on page
491 the following language is found:
''Our power to review also is circumscribed
by the provision that findings of the Board as to
the fact, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. 10 (e), 49 Stat. 454, c 372, 29 U.S.C.A.
160 (e). So we have power only to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support
the Board, or its order over steps the law. Nationa! Labor Relations Board vs. Link-Belt Co.,
311 U. S. 584, 85 L. ed. 368, 61 S. Ct. 358; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 313 U. S. 146, 85 L. ed. 1251.
''The issue as to what unit is appropriate for
bargaining is one for which no absolute rule of
law is laid down by statute, and none should be
by decision. It involves of necessity a large measure of informed discretion and the decision of
the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed.
While we do not say that a determination of a
unit of representation cannot be so unreasonable
and arbitrary as to exceed the Board's power,
we are clear that the decision in question does
not do so. That settled our power is at an end."
Nowhere is it denied that the union did not represent a majority of the Company's employees in the
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laundy tmit. Indeed 100% of the evidence points to the
contrary. Upon a detennination that the union represented close to 100% of the Company's employees in
such unit, Sub-section (a) of the Statute was fully and
c01npletely complied with. A Inere majority of the employees in such unit is the exclusive representative of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collectiYe bargaining. Our adversary contends, there is no
evidence to support the Board's finding that a production unit or Inore properly the laundry unit is appropriate. Again all of the evidence points in one direction,
exeept the evidence of -:\fr. Callister.
:Mr. Harry F. Harter, a witness called on behalf of
the union, testified on pages 3 and 4 of the Transcript of
June 2-±th, 1948, as follows:
BY ).IR. BECK:
business~

Q.

vVha t is your

A.

International organizer for the Laundry
Workers.

Q.

\v"llere is your place of

A.

69 South State Street.

Q. In Salt Lake

business~

City~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

How long have you been identified with organized labor generally~

A.

Since 1936.

Q.

Are you acquainted generally with the business of the Respondent~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
.A.

I am.

Q. Where is it

located~

.A. South Temple and Main.

Q. In this
.A.

city~

Yes, sir.

Q. Is it engaged generally in the hotel
.A.

business~

Yes, sir.

Q. .And as a part of its business what does it
operate over which your labor organization
customarily takes jurisdiction~
.A.

Laundry work, linen for the hotel.

Q. What kind of service does that include that
you speak of 1
.A.

Laundering linen.

Q. .Anything else 1
.A.

That is all I know of.

Q. Linen for what

use~

.A.

To be used in the hotel.

Q.

Bedroom and table

.A.

Yes.

linen~

Q. .And also service to the
.A.

Yes.

culinary~

. . .

Q. Would you be good enough, Mr. Harter, to
describe and define an employee unit appropriate for the purposes of bargaining with
the Employer with respect to hours and conditions of employment, particularly in a unit
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over which your organization custmnarily
takes jurisdiction' (Objection.)

Q.

Go ahead.

A.

~\ll employees en1ployed by the Hotel Utah
in the laundry department in the production
end of it. That includes the girls and boys
in the wash room and the shaker and mangles.

Q.

That includes the employees operating the
manglesf

A.

Yes.

Q.

And operating the washing machines T

A.

Yes, sir, the shakers and pressers.

Q.

You are speaking now for the most part with
respect to the laundering and finishing of
linen for culinary service departments in the
hotel'

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

\Vithin the plant and a part of the operations
of the hotel~~

A.

Yes, sir. . . .

Q.

All right then, l\1:r. Harter. So there can be
no mistake about it, the unit that you have
defined will be commonly known and designated as a laundry unit within the Hotel
Utah~

A.

Yes.

Q.

And over that unit your organization takes
jurisdiction~

A.

Yes.
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Q.

How many employees is the laundry unit in
the Hotel Utah composed of~

A.

Approximately thirty-five.

Q.

Thirty five. And those are the employees
composing such unit and are for the most
part engaged there directly or indirectly contributing-I mean engaged in laundering~

A.

Yes.

Q.

Laundering the linens for the Hotel Utah's
use~

A.

Yes.

Mr. Max Carpenter, the assistant manager of the
Hotel Utah, was called to the witness stand, not by the
Company, but by the Board. After being duly sworn,
he testified as follows:
BY COM. EDWARDS:

Q. Will you state your name, please?
A.

Max Carpenter.

Q.

You reeside at the Hotel Utah?

A.

Yes, Assistant Manager at the Hotel Utah.

Q.

How many employees are employed in the
particular unit requesting certification by the
Union~

A.

Q.

I couldn't give you the exact number because
it changes all the time. I would say about
forty; that is an estimate, of course.
Does ·that include all of the inside laundry
workers~
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A.

Ye~.

Q. "'\Vould you
workers?
A.

sa~T

there are forty inside laundry

I would say that, yes.

Q. You have seen this petition for Investigation
and Certification have you not, Mr. CarpenterY
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

There are no other type of workers involved
or that you consider as inside laundry workers in the number that you have given me at
this time, which is forty1

A.

I don't believe I get that question, Mr. Commissioner.

Q. Do you have any people that deliver from
the laundry, or bring things to the laundry
at the Hotel Utah that are included in the
forty production workers that you have mentioned1
A.

Well, the contact, or the effect of the laundry
for the rest of the Hotel would reach the entire Hotel, because it does work for the Hotel,
it comes in contact with the boys that bring
down the laundry, and they take the laundry
back to the room. In other words, there is a
contact there although they are not on the
laundry pay-roll.

Q.

They are not on the laUtnd.ry pay-roll, and t:he
people you ha.ve mentioned are on the laundry- pay-roll?
A. Yes.
COM. EDWARDS: That is all. (Emphasis ours)
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Thus it was freely admitted by the assistant manager of the Hotel Utah Company, that no employees
except the production or laundry unit were on the Hotel
Utah laundry payroll. Which admission is evidence
abundant, that the craft unit found by the Board is not
only the proper and appropriate unit, but it is the most
convenient for the Hotel, because and by reason of the
fact, that all of the employees comprising such unit were
inside employees, and on one and only one particular
payroll, to-wit: the Lawndry P.a;yroll.
The general rule, is that if there is any substantial
evidence whatsoever to support the Board's findings,
then and in that event, the Courts are without power to
set them aside. In support of the above rule, we cite
the following cases:
National Labor Relations Board vs. Nevada
Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105:
"W·e have repeatedly held that Congress, by
providing, Section 10 (c), (e) and (f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A., Section
1600 (c), (e) and (f) that the Board's findings
'as to the facts if supported by evidence, shall
be conclusive,' precludes the courts from weighing evidence in reviewing the Board's orders, and
if the findings of the Board are supported by
evidence the courts are not free to set them aside
even though the Board could have drawn different
inferences.''
American Foundry & l\fachine Company vs.
Utah Labor Relations Board, 105 Utah 83, 141
Pac. 2d 390:
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''The only question heforP this Court is
whether on the record as it now stands, these findings are supported by substantial evidence. It
is not a question of weighing the evidence, and
determining what decision we would have arrived
at had we been n1e1nbers of the board. Tt is well
established that if the award or finding is supported by substantial evidence, then it must be
sustained by this Court on review. Our own Court
has passed on this question in Buildings Service
Employees vs. X ewhouse Realty Co., et al, 97
Utah 562, 95 P. 2d 507.''
See Packard :Jfotor Car Co. vs. National Labor Relations Board, supra.
Xational Labor Relations Board vs. Lettie
Lee, Inc., 140 Fed. 2d 2-t-3 ( CCa 9) 1944.
"The choice of an appropriate unit for collective bargaining is one for the official judgment
of the Board and unless the decision of the Board
as to the appropriate unit passes the bounds of
permissive discretion of the administrative body
in the particular case, the Court c.annot interfere
in such matters.''
Hence it would seem speeious and hollow for our
adversary to contend that it~ convenience is interfered
with by the selection of a craft unit or that the Board
acted arbitrarily and was motivated by some capricious
whim. The Board was not groping in a factual vacuum
in this case. The Board went through its usual investigation before the hearing. The Board then heard the testimony of ~Ir. Harter describing the unit. The Board then
heard Mr. Carpenter testify, that the laundry unit and
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payroll was a distinct and segregated craft set up within
the general hotel operation. The Board examined the exhibits in this case.
There is no merit to Petitioner's assignment No. 3.
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNr.JENT OF ERROR NO.4
"The Utah Labor Relations Board erred in
providing in its order that Hotel Utah Company
cease and desist from any further unfair labor
practices as set forth in Section 49-1-16, Subsection 1, Paragraph d, Utah Code Annotated
1943 as amended.''
The rather doubtful point here raised by our opponent, seems to be, that the Board should have used
the word" such" instead of the word "any" at the end
of line one of paragraph 1 of the order of the Board.
We fail to see n1uch substance in such super technical
argument. The only case that was before the Board
was this case and the only unfair labnr practices that
were before the Board were the unfair labor practices
charged in the complaint in this case; so quite naturally
the Board ordered the Hotel Utah Company to bargain,
because they refused to bargain, in defiance of the Board.
The Board used the words ''any further unfair labor
practices." It plainly meant what everyone knows, towit: The unfair labor practices set out in the complaint
which were admitted by the Company.
That the Board could have improved the language
it used in the order· we admit, but it is silly to argue
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that the Board had other cases in mind. rrhe point is
trifling.
In support of the power of the Board to issue such
an order we cite the following case:
National Labor Relations Board vs. Cheney
Cal. Lumber Co .. 327 U. S. 385:
•' The court below struck out frorn the
Board's order paragraph 1 (b) "'hereby the Company \Yas ordered, after appropriate treatment
of the unfair labnr practice arising from prohibited
discharge of employees to cease and desist from
'(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act'.
"The Court found warrant for its excision
of this provision in National Labor Relations
Board vs. Express Pub. Co., 312 U. S. 426, 85 L.
ed. 930, 61 S. Ct. 693, supra. That case, however,
recognized that it was withtin the power of the
Board to make an order precisely like 1 (b). It
merely held that whether such an inclusive provision as 1 (b) is justified in a particular case
depends upon the circumstances of the particular
case before the Board. See 312 U.S. at 433, 437,
438. Here the trial examiner recommended the
inclusion of 1 (b) on the basis of his review of
past hostilities by the company against efforts at
unionization ; no exception was made either to
the findings or this recommendation; upon full
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consideration of the record the Board adopted
the trial examiner's recommendation; no objection was raised by the Company until after the
Board sought judicial enforcement of this order.
The objection comes too late." . . .
On page 389 of 327 U. S.: "Justification of
such an order, which necessarily involves consideration of the facts which are the foundation
of the order, is not open for review by a court if
no prior objection has been urged before the case
gets into court and there is a total want of extraordinary circumstances to excuse 'the failure or
neglect to urge such objection'. Congress desired
that all controversies of fact, and the allowable
inferences from the facts, be thrashed out, certainly in the first instance, before the Board. It
was therefore not within the power of the court
below to make the deletion it made.''
We see no merit in Petitioner's Assignment No.4.
PETITIONER'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
''The Utah Labor Relations Board did not
have the authority to issue any order or make
any findings. ' '
In this behalf we invite the court's attention to the
paragraph on page 32 of Petitioner's brief, to-wit:
''Nor is there any allegation that any person
or particularly the Hotel Utah, is engaging in
any unfair labor practice affecting intrastate
commerce of the orderly operation of industry."
The mere fact that it is admitted the Hotel Utah
Company is in business in Salt Lake City, Utah; that
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it operates a laundry: and that about 30 of :-;neh laundry
employees have asked the Utah Labor Relations Board
to certify the union as their collective bargaining agent;
that the Board took jurisdirtion and certified the union,
in writing, as the collertiYe bargaining agent for all the
employees in Petitioner's laundry unit; that the Board
found the Company guilty of unfair labor practiceswould seem abundantly clear that state romrnerce was
affected.
Assume the N" ational Labor Relations Board has
concurrent jurisdiction or even exclusive jurisdiction in
the premises. That is a defense for the Company to
raise-and maybe they don't want it raised; maybe they
are happy the National Labor Relations Board does not
have jurisdiction, if it does not have. At any rate the
Company admits it is in business in Utah, and if they
are guilty of violating the Board's express order, and
the Company admits that it is guilty of such violationthen and in that event, it is perfectly obvious, that such
violation affects intrastate commerce-and a fortiori,
Interstate Commerce would also be affected if such
commerce is involved here. Whatever the consequence,
Petitioner's last mentioned statement just does not
square with the law or the facts. We submit an illustration, and quote from the opening paragraph and paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the charge:
"Comes now the petitioner and pursuant to
Title 49-1 Utah Code annotated 1943, as arnended
1947, and the rules and regulation of Utah Labor
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Relations Board, does hereby charge as follows,
to-wit:

I.
''That respondent who's address is South
Temple and Main streets in Salt Lake City and
County, State of Utah, is engaged in a general
hotel business in said city, and as such has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
pursuant to said title and especially paragraphs
d, c, b and a, of Section 49-1-16 thereof and Section 49-1-15 thereof.

II.
"That petitioner is an affiliate of American
Federation of Labor, that petitioner's address is
59 South State Street in said city. That petitioner
is now, and ever since the 5th day of August, 1948,
has been the duly authorized collective bargaining
representatives of a majority of respondents employees in a collctive bargaining unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining on behalf of such employees respecting hours, wages,
and conditions of employment.

VII.
''That such wnfair labor practices on the part
of respondent are unfair labor practices affecting
intras:t!a,te commerce ·and the orderly operation of
industry within the meaning of said .act."
We quote paragraph 1 and 2 of the Board's complaint:
"1. That the Hotel Utah Company, hereinafter referred to as Respondent, is a corporaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion organized under the laws of the State of
Utah and as such is doing !Jusiness in Salt Lake
City, Utah.
· · ~. That Re~pondent is an en1ployer within
the n1eaning of Title -HLl-10, Sub-section (2)."
\Y e quote paragraphs 1, 6, 8 and 9 of the Board's
findings of faet:

''1. That Hotel Utah Con1pany, hereinafter
referred to as respondent, is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Utah and
as such is doing business in Salt Lake City, Utah.
"6. That the Utah Labor Relations Board
certified the Petitioner as the legally selected and
designated agent of the employees of eRspondent in the above described unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining on August 5, 1948.
"8. That Respondent did refuse to bargain
with Complainant on the grounds: (a) That the
unit found by the Board was not an appropriate
unit. (b) That the Board's method of determining the Collective Bargaining Representative, if
any, was not in conformity with the Utah Labor
Relations Act.
"9.
gain.''

That Respondent did refuse to bar-

We quote paragraph 1 of the Company's Answer
to the Board's Complaint.
'' 1. Adm~t's the allegations contained, m
paragraphs 1 and 2.''

Obviously, it was alleged, admitted, proved and
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found that the Hotel Utah Company was in intrastate
business in Utah. That it was guilty of certain unfair
labor practices, manifestly that could not be so unless
its business was affected, at least to some extent-good,
bad, or indifferent in ·such a labor controversy.
Teamsters Local Union No. 222 and the Industrial Commission vs. Strevell-Paterson Hardware Co., 174 Pac. 2d 164, 1948:
''As we read the case the jurisdiction of the
Board in each particular case does not depend
upon a finding by it to the effect that the act. or
acts complained of affect interstate commerce, but
whether in fact the act or acts complained of
actually do or may reasonably affect the free flow
of interstate commerce. In the instant case defendant admitted it was engaged in intrastate
commerce. That being so, the Board had jurisdiction to hear the matter and make the order
complained of if there was sufficient evidence of
acts of defendant which would affect intrastate
commerce . . . ''
Petitioner's assignment of error No. 5 has no merit.
IN CONCLUSION WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT

I.
That the Board's findings of fact were more detailed, full and comprehensive than the Statute requires.
That such findings were concurred in and agreed to
unanimously by the Board.
II.
That the method of selecting a collective bargaining
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agent i~ ~trirtly within the di~eretion of the Boardthat all of the eYidence introduced supports the Board's
procedure in fixing the collective bargaining agent; that
the evidence wa~ far n1ore than ample and sufficient.

III.
That Section -!9-1-17 Sub-section (b) Utah Code
Annotated provides that the Board shaH decide in each
ease. respecting the welfare of the employees; the insurance of self-organization and collective bargaining in
behalf of e1nployees. That the Board shall decide in the
interest of the employees, commensurate with effectuating the policies of the Act, whether the collective bargaining unit shall be a craft, plant, employer, or a combination sub-division unit.
The selection of a collective bargaining unit entirely
rests ·within the discretion of the Board. The Board
decided that the unit most suitable to serve the best
interest of all parties should be a craft unit-indeed the
Board could not very well have decided otherwise, unless
there occurred some reason to ignore the evidence, for
the reason, that the evidence and all the evidence and all
the witnesses (excepting Mr. Callister) support the selection of a craft bargaining unit; moreover a craft unit was
the unit desired by these employees.

IV.
That the order of the Board must be construed in
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of which orders the Company to ''cease and desist from
any further unfair labor practices'' must necessarily
apply only to those practices under consideration by the
Board in the instant case. We submit that to substitute
the word "such" for "any" would effectuate no substantive change in the order.

v.
The Union alleged and the Company admitted, commerce as contemplated in the Act.
We respectfully pray the Court to enter its decree
to the end that the order of the Utah Labor Relations
Board herein be forthwith enforced.
All of which we respectfully submit.

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney Gener>al
MARK K. BOYLE,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant,
Utlah Laboff Relations Board

CLARENCE M. BECK,
REID W. NIELSON,
Attorneys for Defendant,
Laundry Workers Local
Union No. 316.
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